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Abstract 
In four experiments we showed that picture naming latencies are affected by beliefs 
about the task concurrently performed by another speaker. Participants took longer to 
name pictures when they believed that their partner concurrently named pictures than 
when they believed their partner was silent (Experiments 1 and 4) or concurrently 
categorized the pictures as being from the same or from different semantic categories 
(Experiment 2). However, picture naming latencies were not affected by beliefs about 
what one’s partner said, as it did not matter whether participants believed their partner 
produced the same utterance, or an utterance that differed by ordering (Experiments 1 
and 2) or lexical content (Experiments 3 and 4). These findings are consistent with the 
proposal that speakers represent whether another speaker is preparing to speak, but 
not what they are preparing to say.  
 
Keywords: joint task; co-representation; actor-conflict; language production; picture 
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Interference in Joint Picture Naming 
 
Is the way in which people speak affected by their beliefs about other people’s 
speech? If so, it would suggest that speakers’ representations of their partners’ speech 
are in the same format as speakers’ representations of their own speech (as the former 
can affect the latter). It is often assumed that language production and comprehension 
share representations (the parity hypothesis; Pickering & Garrod, 2004), and that this 
explains effects of comprehension on production. However, we do not know whether 
people form representations of others’ utterances when they are not comprehended 
but only imagined, and whether such representations are in the same format as 
representations of their own utterances. To address this question, we asked whether 
performance in a joint picture-naming task differs depending on whether the speaker 
is told that his partner is concurrently performing the same or a related task, or no 
task. 
Evidence that comprehended utterances affect concurrent production comes, 
for example, from the picture-word interference paradigm. In this paradigm, 
participants name pictures while ignoring written (or auditory) distractor words. 
Responses are fastest when the distractor word is the picture’s name. But more 
importantly, they are slower when the distractor is another word than when the 
distractor is a row of Xs (e.g., Glaser & Düngelhoff, 1984). This shows that 
comprehension of the distractor word affects production of the target word. But even 
if representations used during language comprehension are in the same format as 
representations used during language production, we do not know whether 
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comprehending another person’s utterance and imagining such an utterance have 
comparable effects on production.  
If we treat language production as a form of action and language 
comprehension as a form of perception, then parity in language constitutes an 
example of common coding (Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Prinz, 
1997); i.e., the hypothesis that action and perception share a representational code. In 
addition, if we specifically treat language comprehension as a form of action 
perception (i.e., perception of others’ actions), this hypothesis leads to the claim that 
representations of others’ actions are in the same format as representations underlying 
one’s own actions (Heyes, 2011; Knoblich, Butterfill, & Sebanz, 2011; Sebanz, 
Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006; Wilson & Knoblich, 2005).  
This predicts that representing the actions of others affects the planning and 
execution of one’s own actions. This prediction has been confirmed by several 
studies. First, studies using individual tasks (i.e., tasks in which one participant is 
acting alone) showed that perceiving an action activates the motor representations 
underlying that action, in a way that is automatic and interferes with execution of a 
different action (see Heyes, 2011 for a review). This is analogous to findings from 
picture-word interference studies. Second, studies using joint tasks showed how 
participants ”acting together” automatically represent their partner’s task as well as 
their own (see Knoblich, et al., 2011 for a review), even when it is not relevant for 
their own task, and when doing so interferes with the execution of their own task. 
Importantly for the current study, joint interference effects are known to occur 
even if the participants are not interacting and might in fact be seated in different 
rooms (see, for example, Experiment 3 in Atmaca, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2011). In 
other words, the belief of acting with another person can be sufficient to induce 
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representations of that person’s task in the participant. If speakers similarly represent 
an absent partner’s utterances (even if the partner’s speech is not perceived but only 
imagined), and if they do so in a way that is similar to how they represent their own 
utterances, then they should be affected by these representations while producing their 
own utterances.  
In this study, we tested two speakers simultaneously, but they were seated in 
separate rooms and could not hear each other. However, they could infer what their 
partner was about to say because they could see their partner’s instructions as well as 
their own (i.e., they held beliefs about their partner’s task). Therefore, we tested 
whether representations of others’ utterances are formed in a non-interactive joint task 
setting, in which two individuals produce language alongside each other, but are not 
using language to communicate. A further question we investigated is whether 
representations of others’ utterances are content-specific – whether people represent 
what their partner is saying, or whether they simply represent that their partner is 
naming or, more generically, that their partner is acting in some way. This question is 
motivated by a recent debate in the literature on joint interference effects, as we 
explain in more detail in the following section. 
 
Representing Another’s Task 
A clear demonstration that one’s partner’s task is automatically represented 
comes from experiments that used the Simon effect (Hommel, Colzato, & van den 
Wildenberg, 2009; Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003, 2005; Sebanz, Knoblich, Prinz, 
& Wascher, 2006; Tsai, Kuo, Jing, Hung, & Tzeng, 2006; Tsai, Kup, Hung, & Tzeng, 
2008; Vlainic, Liepelt, Colzato, Prinz, & Hommel, 2010). In the classic (solo) Simon 
task, participants respond to non-spatial properties of visual stimuli (e.g., color) with 
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their right or left hand. The spatial location or orientation of the stimulus, though 
irrelevant to the task, affects performance. In particular, a SR spatial compatibility 
effect is observed: Responses to left stimuli with the right hand and to right stimuli 
with the left hand (incongruent SR mapping) are slower than responses to left stimuli 
with the left hand and responses to right stimuli with the right hand (congruent SR 
mapping).  
Importantly, this effect is absent (e.g., Sebanz, et al., 2003), or greatly reduced 
(e.g., Sebanz, et al., 2005), in a go/no-go version of the same task. However, when the 
task is distributed across two people, so that each participant performs only half of the 
task (as in the go/no-go version) but alongside a partner who takes turns with them 
and performs the other half of the task, a compatibility effect is often observed (this is 
termed the joint Simon effect). Studies have also demonstrated joint effects in other 
tasks, such as the SNARC task (Atmaca, Sebanz, Prinz, & Knoblich, 2008) and the 
Flanker task (Atmaca, et al., 2011). 
What is the source of joint interference effects? According to the task co-
representation account, the partner’s task (set of SR mappings) is automatically 
represented in a joint-task setting. The irrelevant features of the stimulus activate the 
partner’s response, which then interferes with the participant’s own response (Sebanz, 
et al., 2005). Specifically, this account predicts that interference occurs when the 
partner’s response and the participant’s own response are incongruent or 
incompatible. 
So, for example, a participant sitting on the right of the screen responded to 
the color of a stimulus (e.g., a photograph of a human hand) more slowly if the 
stimulus evoked the response of her partner sitting on the left of the screen (i.e., the 
hand was pointing to the left; see Sebanz et al., 2003) than if the stimulus evoked her 
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own response (i.e., the hand was pointing to the right). According to the task co-
representation account, this occurred because she coded her partner’s response as a 
“left” response, and she coded her own response as a “right” response. The orientation 
of the stimulus evoked these spatial codes, as did preparing one’s own response. If the 
codes mismatched, interference occurred: Execution of the response was slowed 
down. 
Note, however, that the task co-representation account has been challenged. 
According to the actor co-representation account (Wenke et al., 2011), people 
represent whether another actor might (potentially) be responding on the current trial, 
but they do not represent another actor’s task, and therefore they do not represent 
another actor’s response. According to the actor co-representation account, joint 
interference effects are thus due to an actor identification conflict rather than to 
response conflict. In other words, it is the fact that one’s partner might (potentially) be 
responding on the current trial that matters, not the nature of their response. The 
account predicts that double-response trials (i.e., trials that evoke a response from 
both co-actors) should show longer latencies than single-response trials (i.e., trials that 
evoke a response from only one co-actor). This pattern should occur irrespective of 
whether a congruent response or an incongruent response is evoked.  
Philipp and Prinz’s (2010) results speak in favor of the actor co-representation 
account. They reported a joint actor-face compatibility effect in an experiment in 
which speakers had to respond to colored shapes by uttering their own or their 
partner’s name. Together with the target shape, they were shown a picture of their 
own or their partner’s face (as task irrelevant distractors). Responses were faster when 
participants saw their own face than when they saw their partner’s face, regardless of 
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which name they used. Participants in this study appear to have interpreted the 
pictured face as a cue to whose turn it was to respond (see Wenke et al., 2011, p. 165). 
Interestingly, various studies found joint interference effects when partners 
were seated in the same room but could not perceive each other (Sebanz, et al., 2005; 
Vlainic, et al., 2010). Such effects occurred even when participants sat in a room on 
their own but were led to believe another person was performing the task with them. 
The finding occurred both when the participant obtained feedback while carrying out 
the task (i.e., a stimulus on the participant's screen signalled when the believed partner 
produced a response; see Ruys & Aarts, 2010; Tsai, et al., 2008) and when no 
feedback was available (Atmaca, et al., 2011).  
The literature on joint tasks has focused on tasks involving manual responses. 
However, a few studies have shown joint interference effects with verbal responses. 
In addition to Philipp and Prinz’s (2010) study reported above, Pickering and McLean 
(2013) had participants perform a joint version of the Stroop task, in which each 
participant responded to only one color. Stroop interference was larger in this joint 
version than in the go/no-go version, where only one participant responded to only 
one color, and the other did not respond (at least when the participants in the joint 
version of the task provided feedback to each other’s responses). This showed that 
participants represented their partner’s potential response and that this caused 
additional interference with their own response on incongruent trials. 
The present study investigated whether joint task effects can occur when 
participants are asked to produce the names of pictured entities. Unlike Philipp and 
Prinz (2010) and Pickering and McLean (2013), the response set was large and 
stimulus-response mappings were not arbitrary.  Participants saw pairs of pictures, 
and were cued to name one picture or both pictures in a particular order.  They were 
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also cued about whether their partner simultaneously named the picture(s) either in 
the same (“congruent”) way or in a different (“incongruent”) way, or did not name 
any pictures.  We investigated whether belief about what one’s partner was doing 
affected naming latencies. 
 Note that our participants could not interact: They named pictures at the same 
time as one another, but could not hear each other. Therefore, participants might not 
represent their partner’s utterances at all. The studies that showed that non-interacting 
participants display joint interference effects (e.g., Atmaca, et al., 2011) all used 
manual responses. We do not know whether the same would hold for verbal 
responses, particularly because language is more tightly associated with 
communicative situations than manual actions. If other-representations are not 
formed, we would expect naming latencies to be unaffected by beliefs about one’s 
partner’s task. We term this the no co-representation account.  
Our study attempted to test among the task co-representation account, actor 
co-representation, and no co-representation account.  The task co-representation 
account assumes that participants represent the content of their partner’s response; 
therefore, in the case of verbal responses, this account predicts that participants should 
activate lexical representations corresponding to their partner’s responses.  The actor 
co-representation account predicts that participants represent that their partner is 
responding but not the content of her response. The no co-representation account 
predicts that participants do not represent their partner’s behavior. 
In four joint picture-naming experiments, pairs of participants sat in separate 
soundproof rooms, received instructions that informed them of their task and their 
partner’s task, and were presented with pairs of pictures. In Experiment 1, participants 
named both pictures and we manipulated whether they believed their partner was 
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naming the pictures in the same order, the reverse order, or did not name the pictures.  
Experiment 2 replaced the final condition with a condition in which participants 
believed their partner was deciding whether the pictures were from the same category 
or not. In Experiment 3, participants named one picture and believed their partner 
named the same picture, the other picture, or no picture. Experiment 4 was the same 
as Experiment 3 except that the pictures were degraded.   
Both the task and the actor co-representation accounts predict that participants 
should take longer to name pictures when they believe their partner is also naming 
pictures than otherwise.  In addition, the task co-representation account predicts that 
participants should take longer to name pictures when they believe that their partner is 
naming pictures in an incongruent way (either a different picture or the same two 
pictures in the opposite order) than a congruent way.  The actor co-representation 
account predicts that participants will be unaffected by congruency (i.e., they would 
represent that their partner is responding, but not what she is saying).  Finally, the no 
co-representation account predicts that naming will be unaffected by participants’ 
beliefs about what their partner is doing. 
In all experiments, we also varied whether the two pictures were semantically 
related or not.  Semantic relatedness leads to interference in picture-word tasks 
(Schriefers, Meyer, & Levelt, 1990).  But in picture-picture tasks when participants 
name one picture, studies have found no semantic effects (Damian & Bowers, 2003; 
Navarrete & Costa, 2005) or facilitation (La Heij, Heikoop, Akerboom, & Bloem, 
2003).  In contrast, people are slower to initiate naming pairs of semantically related 
than unrelated pictures (Aristei, Zwitserlood, & Abdel Rahman, 2012; see also Smith 
& Wheeldon, 2004).  Therefore we predicted semantic inference when participants 
named both pictures (Experiment 1 and 2) but not when they named one picture 
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(Experiment 3 and 4), regardless of their beliefs about their partner’s behavior.  It is 
possible that semantic interference would be affected by beliefs about one’s partner’s 
task, if the task co-representation account is correct, and we address this in relation to 
individual experiments below. 
Finally, note that we manipulated participants’ beliefs about their partner’s 
task while holding partner’s presence constant, as the mere presence of another person 
affects performance in verbal tasks (see e.g., Klauer, Herfordt, & Voss, 2008). To this 
aim, the partner’s instructions were displayed on the screen together with the 
participants’ instructions, and participants attended to the same stimuli as their 
partner. In this way, it was also possible to manipulate participants’ beliefs on a trial-
by-trial basis, and thus investigate whether representations of others’ utterances are 
continuously updated. 
 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, two differently colored pictures were presented 
simultaneously to both participants. On each trial, before the pictures appeared, an 
instruction screen showed the names of the two participants accompanied by the 
words red, blue, or no. Red and blue corresponded to “go” trials: The participant was 
instructed to name the picture presented in the given color first, and then name the 
other picture. No corresponded to “no-go” trials: The participant was instructed to 
give no response.  
We manipulated the order in which the other participant (the partner) 
concurrently named the pictures (Partner’s task), as follows. On trials on which the 
two participants were assigned the same color (blue-blue or red-red), they named the 
pictures in the same order, therefore producing the same verbal response (SAME 
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condition). On trials on which the two participants were assigned different colors 
(blue-red or red-blue), they named the pictures in reverse order, therefore producing 
different verbal responses (DIFFERENT condition). Finally, when either of the 
participants was assigned a “no-go” trial (red-no, blue-no, no-red, no-blue), one 
participant named the pictures while their partner produced no response (NO 
condition). See Figure 1 for a summary of the Partner’s task manipulation employed 
in Experiment 1. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
We expected Partner’s task to affect naming latencies. Specifically, according 
to the task co-representation account, naming latencies should be longer in the 
DIFFERENT condition than in the SAME condition. This is because it assumes that 
other-representations are content-specific; that is, they specify the lexical items that 
the partner is retrieving. Note that, because the speakers always named both pictures, 
their utterances always contained the same lexical items. However, when the order 
differed, the picture that the speaker had to name second was the picture that their 
partner had to name first. Therefore, in the DIFFERENT condition the representation 
of the partner’s response might enhance activation of the second picture’s name. This 
would in turn result in the second picture’s name competing more for selection with 
the first picture’s name, leading to longer naming latencies. Instead, when the 
representation of one’s partner response specified the same order as the representation 
of one’s own response (SAME condition), the first picture’s name was also the word 
that one’s partner had to retrieve first. Therefore, the activation level of the first 
picture’s name might be raised and competition with the second picture’s name might 
Running head: JOINT INTERFERENCE IN NAMING 
13 
 
be reduced (compared to the DIFFERENT condition). The predictions of the task co-
representation account are summarized in Figure 2 (panel A). 
Alternatively, according to the actor co-representation account, speakers do 
not represent the content of their partner’s response, but they represent whether their 
partner is responding on the current trial or not. If this is the case, the relationship 
between self- and other-representations would not affect processing, and hence 
naming latencies would be equivalent in the SAME and DIFFERENT conditions. 
However, naming latencies should be longer in the SAME and DIFFERENT 
conditions than in the NO condition, because in the latter participants believe that 
their partner is not responding. The predictions of the actor co-representation account 
are summarized in Figure 2 (panel B). 
Finally, according to the no co-representation account, another person’s 
utterances should not be represented at all under the conditions tested in our 
experiment (i.e., in the absence of interaction). The account therefore predicts that the 
Partner’s task manipulation will have no effect (i.e., there will be no difference 
between the SAME, DIFFERENT, and NO conditions). This scenario is presented in 
Figure 2 (panel C). 
As an additional manipulation, participants saw either two semantically related 
(e.g., apple – banana) or two semantically unrelated pictures (e.g., apple – blouse). 
Smith and Wheeldon (2004) showed that the time to initiate descriptions of moving 
displays containing two semantically related pictures is longer than the time to initiate 
comparable descriptions of displays containing unrelated pictures. Furthermore, 
Aristei, Zwitserlood, and Abdel Rahman (2012) found that German speakers took 
longer to initiate uttering the names of two pictures (forming a novel noun-noun 
compound) when they were semantically related than unrelated. Therefore, we 
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expected participants to take longer to name pairs of related pictures than pairs of 
unrelated pictures (a main effect of semantic relatedness). The manipulation of 
semantic relatedness therefore served as a manipulation check. In addition, it is 
possible that Relatedness might interact with Partner’s task. If the task co-
representation account is correct and other-representations are content-specific, the 
semantic interference effect could be enhanced in the DIFFERENT condition 
(compared to the SAME condition) because in the DIFFERENT condition the second 
picture’s name receives additional activation from a representation of one’s partner 
response (see above). Note that an interaction of Partner’s Task and Relatedness 
would be not be predicted by the actor co-representation or the no co-representation 
account. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Method 
Participants 
Twelve pairs of previously unacquainted participants from the University of 
Edinburgh student community were paid £6 to participate. All participants reported 
being native speakers of English with no speaking or reading difficulties.  
Materials 
Fifty pictures were paired in two different ways to yield 50 picture-picture 
pairs (25 semantically related, 25 semantically unrelated; see Appendix A). For 
example, apple was paired once with banana (related) and once with blouse 
(unrelated). In turn, banana was paired once with apple (related) and once with frog 
(unrelated). Since one picture was embedded inside the other, half of the pictures 
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were relatively small (about 250x200 pixels), whereas the others were relatively large 
(about 600x500 pixels). Of these 50 pictures, 11 pairs were taken from Damian and 
Bowers (2003), 4 pairs from Navarrete and Costa (2005), and 10 pairs were modeled 
after materials used in the same studies, but modified to avoid phonologically related 
names (as the two studies were not conducted in English). Damian and Bowers (2003) 
and Navarrete and Costa (2005) controlled for visual similarity (i.e., related pairs 
were not visually more similar than the unrelated pairs). When adapting their 
materials, care was taken to pair pictures that were visually dissimilar to each other. 
Eight additional pictures were selected from Snodgrass and VanderWart (1980) to be 
used on practice trials. 
Design  
We manipulated three factors, all within participants: Partner’s task 
(henceforth, Partner; SAME vs. DIFFERENT vs. NO), Relatedness (unrelated vs. 
related), and Size (i.e., size of the first named picture: big vs. small). Partner and 
Relatedness were also manipulated within items, whereas Size was manipulated 
between-items. An item was defined in terms of the first named picture (so apple-
blouse and blouse-apple counted as different items). Partner refers to the task 
assigned to the participant’s partner: he or she named the pictures in the same order 
(SAME; e.g., participant: apple-blouse, partner: apple-blouse), in reverse order 
(DIFFERENT; e.g., participant: apple-blouse, partner: blouse-apple), or did not name 
any pictures (NO; e.g., participant: apple-blouse, partner: “”). Partner varied on a 
trial-by-trial basis.  
Each picture was repeated 16 times across the experiment. In the SAME and 
DIFFERENT conditions, each picture was presented four times (twice in a related 
pair, twice in the unrelated pair). In the NO condition, each picture was presented 8 
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times (four times in a related and four times in an unrelated pair), in order to get the 
same number of data as in the other two conditions. Each participant named each 
picture in first position 6 times, once per cell of the design. 
Because exactly the same instructions and stimuli were presented to both 
participants in the two rooms simultaneously (see below), participants were always 
correctly informed about the task their partner was concurrently performing. This 
means that when one participant completed a trial in the NO condition, the other 
participant did remain silent, and both participants in a pair were assigned to no-go 
trials equally often.  
There were 400 trials in total. These were presented in 4 blocks of 100 trials. 
Each block comprised an equal number of trials in each condition for both 
participants. Because the number of pictures could not be divided by four, and 
because of the requirement that participants named big and small pictures equally 
often in first position, it was not possible to ensure that each picture was named an 
equal number of times in each block. However, the order of presentation was pseudo-
randomized, separately for each pair and for each block, with the constraint that the 
same picture never appeared on two consecutive trials. The order of blocks was also 
counterbalanced across pairs. 
On every trial, one picture was red and the other was blue. Participants were 
cued to start either with the red or the blue picture. To prevent response strategies, we 
counterbalanced the following factors within each block: color-participant pairing 
(whether a given participant named the red or the blue picture in first position), color-
size (whether the red picture was small and the blue picture was large or vice versa), 
and order of instructions (whether the color cue for a given participant was displayed 
in the top half or in the bottom half of the screen). 
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Procedure  
Participants were tested in adjacent soundproof rooms. Each was seated at a 
distance of about 90 cm in front of a 48-cm 60 Hz LCD monitor; both monitors were 
connected to the same machine in the control room (so stimulus presentation was 
simultaneous). Stimulus presentation was controlled using E-Prime (Version 2.0). 
There was a window between the two rooms, but participants could only perceive 
each other peripherally when facing the monitors. The two rooms were linked via a 
communication system that allowed the experimenter to control whether the two 
participants could hear each other or not. Participants wore headphones through which 
they could hear their own voice and spoke into high-quality directional microphones 
(AKG Acoustics, Vienna, Austria, www.akg.com). 
Upon entering the lab, the participants were introduced to one another and 
were each taken to a different, randomly assigned room. The experimenter showed all 
the (practice and experimental) pictures on the computer screen once, one at a time, 
with the corresponding names, and asked each participant to repeat them to aid 
memorization. Immediately afterwards, the pictures were shown again (without 
names), and each participant was asked to produce the correct name. Participants 
completed this phase in parallel, but without hearing one another. The experimenter 
listened to both participants and provided correct feedback in case either of them 
made a mistake or could not retrieve the name. Participants were then informed that 
they would “work together” and were called out of the booths. Instructions were 
delivered to both participants at the same time in the control room. The instructions 
stressed that they should try to name both pictures as quickly as possible, while still 
preserving accuracy and clear pronunciation. 
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The participants then went back to their respective booths and performed 20 
practice trials. These were similar to experimental trials but used only practice 
pictures, which were matched to form semantically unrelated pairs. They were 
presented in a different random order for each pair. For each participant, on four of 
the practice trials the partner named the pictures in the same order; the partner named 
the pictures in reversed order on four other trials, and in six trials the partner named 
no picture. In the remaining six trials, the participant remained silent while the partner 
named the pictures. Finally, participants began the experimental phase.  
On each trial, first a fixation cross was displayed for 1000 ms, then a display 
(2000 ms) that showed the participants names, each followed by an instruction word. 
After a 500-ms blank, two pictures (one red, one blue) were displayed simultaneously 
(for 400 ms). Each trial was concluded by a 1500 ms inter-stimulus interval. We 
reasoned that the speed of picture presentation would make it difficult for participants 
to use color information strategically (i.e., delaying processing the second picture 
until they have begun uttering the first picture’s name), and thus would encourage 
them to carry out a substantial amount of processing of both pictures in parallel before 
speech onset (Wagner, Jescheniak, & Schriefers, 2010). 
The 4 blocks were separated by breaks of variable length. The participants 
were allowed to rest for as long as they required. The experimenter checked with both 
participants that they were happy to continue before resuming the experiment. An 
experimental session lasted about 1 hour. 
Recording and Data Analysis 
A 75-ms beep (inaudible to participants) was used to mark stimulus 
presentation and was recorded together with the participants’ responses (on three 
separate channels, sampling rate: 48000 Hz) via an M-Audio FireWire 1814 device 
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(inMusic, Cumberland, RI, www.m-audio.com) in Adobe Audition (Version 4.0). 
Beep onsets were automatically tagged using Audacity (Version 1.2.5). Recordings 
were then pre-processed to reduce background noise. Speech onsets were first 
automatically tagged using the Silence finder algorithm in Audacity and later checked 
manually for lip smacks and other non-speech noises. Naming latencies were defined 
as the time from beep onset to response onset.  
We analyzed the data with Generalized Linear mixed-effects models (Bayeen, 
Davidson, & Bates, 2008), as implemented in the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, & 
Dai, 2008; Version 0.999375-28) in R (Version 2.13.1). We chose this method 
because it allows both naming latency and accuracy data to be analyzed within the 
same statistical framework. The LME analyses reported below used a normal link 
function and modeled untransformed naming latencies. However, because the 
distribution of naming latencies was noticeably right-skewed, we also conducted 
LME analyses on inverse-transformed naming latencies (see Appendix B). For the 
accuracy data we used a logistic link function (Jaeger, 2008); a correct response (see 
Results below) was coded as 0, whereas an incorrect response was coded as 1. 
In the LME analyses, we first focused on selection of the random effects 
structure (keeping the fixed effects structure maximal). We started with the full 
random effect structure, including random slopes (for all factors and their interaction) 
and random intercepts for both subjects and items. Since random slopes are only 
appropriate for within factors, we included by-subjects random slopes for Partner, 
Relatedness, and Size, and by-items random slopes for Partner and Relatedness. If the 
model with full random structure did not converge, we simplified it by removing 
higher order terms; we started with the three-way interaction by-subjects and 
proceeded with removing the two-way interactions, one at a time, first by subjects, 
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then by items. Once we found a model that converged, we used backward selection to 
select the slopes that contributed to model fit (with the alpha-level set to .1 to account 
for the conservativity of such tests).
1
 
Once we identified the random effects structure as described above, we 
proceeded to select the best-fitting fixed effects structure. We started by fitting the 
complete model (including the main effects of Partner, Relatedness, and Size, the 
three two-way interactions, and the three-way interaction); we then removed 
predictors that were not significant from the model, using a backward stepwise 
procedure, and stopped whenever removing a predictor caused a significant loss of fit 
(assessed using a log-likelihood ratio test, with the alpha-level set to .05). Marginal 
fixed effects (.05 < p <.1) are reported below for completeness, but we chose not to 
include them in the best-fitting models reported in Appendix B, and we do not attempt 
to interpret them. Note that in case no fixed effects contribute significantly to model 
fit, the best-fitting model is the intercept-only model; such models are not reported. 
All predictors were contrast-coded. For Partner, we defined two planned 
contrasts: naming vs. no compared the DIFFERENT and SAME conditions against 
the NO condition; same vs. different compared the SAME against the DIFFERENT 
                                                 
1
 Barr et al. (2013) recently argued in favour of keeping random effect structures 
maximal in LME analyses. Partly because of the complexity of our experimental 
design, models with full random effect structure seldom converged, despite fixing 
some of the parameters (random correlations between intercepts and slopes) to zero. 
In Appendix B, we report LME analyses that used the maximal random effect 
structure that converged (for a similar approach to reporting LME analyses, see 
Jaeger, Furth, & Hilliard, 2012), and we report significant coefficients from the 
complete model (i.e., the model containing all fixed effects and interactions).   
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condition. Specifically, the following coding scheme was used for all analyses 
reported below, unless otherwise stated: Partner1: SAME: 1/3, DIFFERENT: 1/3, 
NO: -2/3; Partner2: SAME: 1/2, DIFFERENT: -1/2, NO: 0; Relatedness: related: 1/2, 
unrelated: -1/2; Size: small: 1/2, big: -1/2.  
 
Results 
We only report descriptive statistics and the results of likelihood ratio tests in 
this section. See Appendix B for full reports of the best fitting models corresponding 
to the analyses reported in this section (and in the Results sections of the other 
experiments reported in this paper).  
Accuracy 
Responses were coded as correct and entered into the onset time analysis (see 
below) only if both pictures were named correctly. Incorrect responses fell into 4 
different categories: naming errors (the wrong name was used); disfluency (the 
correct name was used, but the response contained hesitations or repetitions); order 
error (the second picture was named before the first picture); no response (the 
participant remained silent when he or she had to respond). Error counts and 
percentages are reported in Table 1. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Removing by-items random slopes for the factor Relatedness significantly 
harmed fit (χ2 (4) =19.70, p<.001). Interestingly, participants produced more incorrect 
responses when their partner named than when he or she remained silent (Partner 1: 
log-odds B= .24, SE = .11, z = 2.23), and also fewer incorrect responses in the SAME 
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than in the DIFFERENT condition (Partner 2: log-odds B = -.23, SE =.08, z= -2.75; 
see Table 1B). Accordingly, Partner contributed significantly to model fit (χ2 (2) 
=13.10, p<.01). The main effect of Relatedness was only marginally significant (χ2 (1) 
=3.54, p= .06) and the corresponding coefficient is not reported in Table 1B.  
Naming Latencies 
Naming latencies longer than 3000 ms or shorter than 300 ms were considered 
outliers and removed from all analyses. However, there were no such cases in 
Experiment 1. Then by-participant means and standard deviations were computed. 
Values that were more than 3 standard deviations from the by-participant mean 
(1.5%) were replaced with the cut-off value.
2
 Mean latencies are reported in Table 2; 
see also Figure 3, Panel A. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
No slopes contributed to fit, so only random intercepts were retained. The 
main effects of Partner (χ2 (2) =7.80, p<.05) and Relatedness (χ2 (1) =11.32, p<.001) 
contributed to fit. The three-way interaction between Partner, Relatedness, and Size 
was only marginally significant (χ2 (2) =5.15, p=.08) and is not included in Table 2B. 
All two-way interactions, including the interaction of Partner and Relatedness were 
not significant.  
Participants took significantly longer to start speaking when their partner was 
also preparing to speak (naming: 876 ms) than when their partner remained silent 
                                                 
2
 Additional analyses performed on the complete data set (with only the outliers above 
3000ms or below 300ms removed) yielded a similar pattern of results. 
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(NO: 864 ms; Partner1: B = 14 ms, SE = 5, t = 2.79). However, average naming 
latencies were very similar in the DIFFERENT (875 ms) and SAME (877 ms) 
conditions (Partner 2: B = 1 ms, SE = 4, t = .17; see Table 2B). Therefore, the main 
prediction of the task co-representation account (i.e., that latencies would be longer in 
the DIFFERENT than in the SAME condition) was not confirmed. In addition, this 
finding is inconsistent with the no co-representation account, but fully consistent with 
the actor co-representation account.  
Finally, replicating previous findings (e.g., Aristei et al., 2012), participants 
took longer when the two pictures were semantically related than when they were 
unrelated (880 vs. 864 ms). Interestingly, the semantic interference effect was similar 
across conditions (12 ms in DIFFERENT, 17 ms in SAME, 17 ms in NO), as 
demonstrated by the lack of an interaction between Partner and Relatedness.  
 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 showed that participants took longer to initiate a naming 
response when they believed their partner was also preparing a naming response. This 
finding rules out the no co-representation account (Figure 2, Panel C).  
The results of Experiment 1 do not fully support the task co-representation 
account (Figure 2, Panel A). Participants made more errors when their partner was 
preparing an incongruent (DIFFERENT) than a congruent (SAME) response. This 
finding might suggest that speakers experienced more interference when they believed 
their partner was preparing an incongruent response, as predicted by the task co-
representation account. However, this pattern in naming accuracy was not confirmed 
by a similar pattern in naming latencies. Participants were no slower when they 
believed their partner was preparing an incongruent response than when they believed 
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they were preparing a congruent response. Additionally, the semantic interference 
effect (longer latencies for related than unrelated responses) was no greater in the 
DIFFERENT (12 ms) than in the SAME condition (17 ms). On the contrary, the 
results of Experiment 1 are fully consistent with the actor co-representation account 
(Figure 2, Panel B), which claims that people represent whether a response occurs or 
not, but they do not represent the content of the response itself. Consistently, latencies 
were longer when both participants named pictures (i.e., DIFFERENT and SAME 
conditions) than when only one did (i.e., NO condition), regardless of the relationship 
between the participant and their partner’s response. However, we must consider 
alternative explanations of this finding.  
The conditions in which participants responded slowly (SAME and 
DIFFERENT) are the ones in which two “go” instructions are displayed on the screen. 
It might be that, despite being addressed by their first name (a highly salient stimulus; 
e.g., Wood & Cowan, 1995), participants were distracted by the presence of their 
partner’s instruction more when it was a “go” instruction than when it was a “no-go” 
instruction. “Go” instructions are words of the same type (color names), whereas “no-
go” instructions used a clearly different word (“no”). Therefore, “go” instructions are 
more similar to each other than they are to “no-go” instructions. Similarity might 
cause interference between memory representations for one’s own and the partner’s 
instructions.  
Note that participants rarely performed their partner’s task by mistake, which 
seems to suggest that they rarely misremembered the instructions. There is however 
some indication that this occurred more often in the DIFFERENT condition (on 2.3% 
of trials speakers named the pictures in their partner’s order), compared to the NO 
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condition (on 1.2% of trials speakers gave no response).
3
 But more importantly, the 
similarity explanation cannot account for why latencies were no longer in the 
DIFFERENT than in the SAME condition (where instructions were identical, so 
interference between memory representations is unlikely to have occurred).
4
 We 
return to this issue in the Discussion to Experiment 2, where we replaced the “no-go” 
instructions with (a different kind of) “go” instructions. Here we note that interference 
between memory representations for the instructions cannot account for the finding 
that naming latencies were slower in both naming conditions (DIFFERENT and 
SAME) than in the NO condition.  
Therefore, we conclude that participants represented whether it was their 
partner’s turn to respond on any given trial and that they experienced interference 
whenever both they and their partner were preparing a response concurrently. But 
what sort of mechanism could be responsible for this interference effect? Participants 
might represent that their partner was “doing something” at the same time that they 
prepared their response. If this is the case, we expect that a belief that one’s partner is 
performing any task would slow down the process of naming to the same extent as a 
belief that they are naming pictures.  
                                                 
3
 Of course, it was not possible to make a mistake of this type in the SAME condition, 
as both participants were given the same instruction. 
4
 In addition, in another study (Van de Cavey, Gambi, MacKenzie, Nelissen, & 
Pickering, 2012, September) we conducted a related experiment where participants 
described simple scenes using active or passive sentences. In that study, we replaced 
the word “no” with “grey” (keeping instructions the same; i.e., to remain silent) and 
found that latencies were still longer when participants believed their partner was 
speaking than when they believed their partner was silent. 
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Alternatively, the interference effect could arise because the same mechanisms 
(i.e., language production mechanisms) are used to represent one’s partner naming 
response and to prepare one’s own naming response. If so, we predict less 
interference when one’s partner is performing a different (non-naming) task than 
when one’s partner is preparing a naming response. Experiment 2 was designed to 
decide between these alternatives. 
 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2 we replaced the NO condition with a semantic categorization 
(hence, CAT) condition. The SAME and DIFFERENT conditions were the same as in 
Experiment 1. In the CAT condition, participants named the pictures while their 
partner judged whether the two pictures were from the same semantic category (as 
discussed below). For example, goat and pig were considered as belonging to the 
same semantic category (animal), while goat and cup were not. Responses to the 
categorization task were given by speaking “yes” or “no” into the microphone.  
Therefore, all trials required an overt verbal response from both participants. 
Consequently, if imagining one’s partner performing any task was driving the effect 
we observed in Experiment 1, we should find no difference between the SAME, 
DIFFERENT, and CAT conditions. We chose the CAT task because it would be 
particularly similar to the naming task and therefore likely to share the same pool of 
attentional resources. First, both tasks involve visual processing of the pictures and 
retrieving the concepts associated with the depicted entities. In addition, both tasks 
involve the articulation of an overt verbal response. Crucially, however, the tasks 
differ in the extent to which they engage language production mechanisms (i.e., 
lexical retrieval).  
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In the naming task, speakers clearly need to access the lexical items 
corresponding to the concepts depicted in the pictures. In the categorization task, 
however, speakers need not access the lexical items, as the task can be performed on 
the basis of conceptual information alone. That indeed speakers do not access the 
names of pictures when they do not perform a naming task is confirmed by Jescheniak 
and Levelt (1994, Experiment 2), in which participants decided whether a picture 
matched a previously presented word or not. Despite the fact that participants were 
exposed to the picture names on matching trials, there was no evidence that they (re-
)accessed the picture names at the moment of performing the task, as shown by the 
lack of a frequency effect.  
More generally, it is common practice in psycholinguistics to contrast picture 
categorization with picture naming in order to disentangle the contribution of 
perceptual and conceptual processing from lexical retrieval processes proper (for a 
similar logic, see for example Almeida, Knobel, Finkbeiner, & Caramazza, 2007 and 
references therein). Therefore, we assume that the naming task engages language 
production mechanisms (i.e., lexical retrieval) to a greater extent than the 
categorization task. If the interference effect in Experiment 1 was specific to 
representing that one’s partner is preparing to name (i.e., is engaging in lexical 
retrieval) it should be replicated in Experiment 2.  
Finally, we retained both the SAME and the DIFFERENT conditions from 
Experiment 1 to provide another test of their comparative effects. The accuracy data 
in Experiment 1 seemed to suggest that the DIFFERENT condition might induce 
more interference than the SAME condition. Therefore, we wanted to check whether 
this effect would be replicated in Experiment 2. The semantic relatedness 
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manipulation was also retained in this experiment (as it ensured that positive and 
negative responses were balanced in the semantic categorization task).  
Method 
Participants 
Sixteen further pairs of participants from the same community as the pairs in 
Experiment 1 were paid to participate. 
Materials and Design 
These were the same as in Experiment 1, except that the NO condition was 
replaced with the CAT condition. In order for participants to practice the semantic 
categorization task, we replaced two of the original practice pictures with two new 
pictures from Snodgrass and VanderWart (1980), so that it would be possible to form 
semantically related pairs (this also involved re-pairing the original pictures). Various 
semantic categories were represented in the materials from Experiment 1 (see 
Appendix A). 
Procedure 
For the semantic categorization task, participants were instructed to respond to 
the word question (which replaced the word no) by answering the following question: 
“Are the two pictures from the same category?” They responded by saying “yes” into 
the microphone if they thought the answer was positive, or “no” if they thought the 
answer was negative. The experimenter provided two examples to clarify what it 
meant for two pictures to be “from the same category” (one example mentioned dog 
and snake as requiring a positive answer, dog and lemon as requiring a negative 
answer; the second example mentioned pen and ruler, as requiring a positive answer, 
pen and door as requiring a negative answer). The experimenter also mentioned the 
relevant superordinate category (i.e., animal; stationery) while illustrating the 
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examples. Otherwise, the instructions and procedure were the same as in Experiment 
1. 
Recording and Data Analyses 
These were exactly the same as in Experiment 1 with regard to naming 
responses. Responses to the semantic categorization task were also analyzed; latencies 
for both positive and negative answers were extracted automatically using the Silence 
Finder feature in Audacity (without manual correction).  
 
Results 
Semantic Categorization Task 
Four types of responses were coded as incorrect: disfluencies (hesitations, 
repetitions), wrong responses, missing responses, and task errors (i.e., when 
participants performed the naming task instead of the categorization task). Overall, 
participants were highly accurate: they responded correctly on 94.7% of the unrelated 
trials and on 93.6% of the related trials. There was no significant difference in the 
number of errors between related and unrelated trials. Task errors amounted to 2.3% 
of the trials (N=77). We also looked at the latency to respond on correct trials. Based 
on the overall distribution of responses, we removed the 4 responses that were shorter 
than 250 ms or longer than 2500 ms. Again, there was no difference between related 
(“yes”) trials (M= 936 ms, SD = 289 ms) and unrelated (“no”) trials (M = 944 ms, SD 
= 291 ms).  
Naming Task 
Accuracy. Incorrect responses were coded as in Experiment 1, except that 
another type of error was possible; occasionally (on 2 trials in DIFFERENT, 4 in 
CAT and 5 in SAME) participants performed the categorization task instead of the 
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naming task. Counts and percentages are reported in Table 3. Removing by-items 
random slopes for the factor Relatedness significantly harmed fit (χ2 (4) =18.38, 
p<.005). The main effect of Relatedness was only marginally significant (χ2 (1) =2.98, 
p=.08). No other factor gave a significant contribution to model fit; therefore, the 
best-fitting model was the intercept-only model (hence this model is not reported in 
Appendix B).  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Naming Latencies. Naming latencies longer than 3000 or shorter than 300 ms 
were considered outliers and removed from all analyses. There were only 2 such cases 
in Experiment 2. Then by-participant means and standard deviations were computed. 
Values than were more than 3 standard deviations from the by-participant mean 
(1.7%) were replaced with the cut-off value.
5
  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
By-participants random slopes for Size (χ2 (5) =46.16, p<.001) and by-items 
random slopes for Relatedness (χ2 (4) =8.21, p<.10) were included. Crucially, Partner 
contributed significantly to model fit (χ2 (2) =6.54, p<.05; see Table 3B). Relatedness 
also contributed significantly to model fit (χ2 (1) =11.04, p<.001). All two-way 
interactions and the three-way interaction were not significant. 
                                                 
5
 Additional analyses performed on the complete data set (with only the outliers above 
3000ms or below 300ms removed) yielded a similar pattern of results. 
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Participants took longer to start naming when their partner was also preparing 
to name (891 ms) than when their partner was preparing to categorize the pictures 
(880 ms; Partner 1: B = 12 ms, SE = 5, t = 2.47). However, average naming latencies 
were no longer in the DIFFERENT (889 ms) than in the SAME (893 ms) condition 
(Partner 2: B = 3 ms, SE = 4, t =.70; see Table 3B).  
Finally, as in Experiment 1, participants took longer when the two pictures 
were semantically related than when they were unrelated (897 vs. 878 ms) and the 
semantic interference effect was similar across conditions (17 ms in DIFFERENT, 28 
ms in SAME, 11 ms in CAT), as demonstrated by the lack of an interaction between 
Partner and Relatedness (see Table 4 and Figure 3, Panel B). 
 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 are again not consistent with the no co-
representation account, as Partner’s task affected naming latencies. In addition, they 
are not consistent with the task co-representation account. As in Experiment 1, 
naming latencies did not differ in the DIFFERENT and SAME condition. In addition, 
and unlike in Experiment 1, the likelihood of producing an incorrect response also did 
not differ in the two conditions (and did not differ significantly from the CAT 
condition, either). Therefore, the task co-representation account’s prediction that 
participants experience more interference when they believe their partner is naming 
the pictures in reverse order than when they believe they are naming in the same order 
was not supported by the results of Experiment 2. In addition, as in Experiment 1, we 
found that speakers were slower at naming pairs of semantically related than unrelated 
pictures, but the semantic interference effect was not larger in the DIFFERENT than 
in the SAME condition.  
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Most importantly, naming latencies were longer when speakers believed that 
their partner was also naming a picture than when they believed that their partner was 
performing a semantic categorization task. Given that the two tasks share all 
processing stages except lexical retrieval, we conclude that the process of naming 
pictures is slowed down by the belief that another speaker is concurrently retrieving 
the pictures’ names. This is not consistent with a version of the actor co-
representation account in which speakers only represent whether it their partner’s turn 
to respond on the current trial. Rather, the results of Experiment 2 suggest that 
speakers specifically represent whether another speaker is planning to name, and not 
just whether their partner is about to respond (in any way). We return to this issue in 
the General Discussion. 
In addition, we note that naming latencies were longer in the Partner-naming 
than in the CAT conditions, even though the CAT condition was also associated with 
“go” instructions for the participants’ partner. This weakens the concern raised in the 
Discussion to Experiment 1 that interference on Partner-naming trials in that 
experiment was due to the presence of similar instructions (both “go” instructions) 
and not to a representation of the partner’s response.  
However, it is possible that the finding that participants represent whether 
their partner is about to name a picture or not is specific to the situation in which 
participants have to encode both pictures’ names, while simultaneously formulating 
an utterance plan that specifies order of mention. These requirements might make the 
task rather demanding and perhaps more sensitive to interference from a 
representation of the other person’s response. To investigate whether similar effects 
would occur when speakers were naming single words, we conducted Experiment 3. 
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Another aim of Experiment 3 was to test whether representations of others’ 
responses are formed when those responses bear no relationship to one’s own 
responses. In Experiment 1 and 2 participants might have formed representations of 
their partner’s responses because those responses always overlapped in content with 
their own responses, and were therefore perceived as somehow associated with their 
own responses. In Experiment 3, we tested a condition in which the partner produced 
a response that was completely different from the participant’s concurrent response 
(except for the fact that the corresponding visual stimulus was co-located with the 
stimulus the participants responded to).  
Finally, in Experiment 3 we provided yet another test of the task co-
representation account. Proponents of this account might note that in Experiments 1 
and 2 the content of the partner’s response (i.e., the identity of the retrieved lexical 
items) was in fact identical in the SAME and DIFFERENT conditions, as the only 
difference was in the order of mention. It is conceivable that people do indeed 
represent the content of their partners’ responses, but not order. Therefore in 
Experiment 3 we changed the instructions so that the partner named either the same 
picture or a different picture than the participant. 
 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 was similar to Experiment 1, except that participants named one 
picture rather than both pictures. Participants named the picture in the assigned color, 
and ignored the other picture. Therefore, we included a condition in which 
participants named a picture while their partner remained silent (NO), a condition in 
which participants named the same picture (SAME), and a condition in which 
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participants named different pictures (DIFFERENT). Of course, participants therefore 
believed their partner was naming one picture or no picture.  
We reasoned that the task would be much less demanding than the task in 
Experiment 1. Speakers had to retrieve and produce only one word. Therefore, we 
expected them to respond at shorter latencies. Of course, this task also requires 
speakers to successfully ignore the non-target picture. There is evidence that distractor 
picture names are accessed during target picture naming (e.g., Meyer & Damian, 
2007; Morsella & Miozzo, 2002; Navarrete & Costa, 2005). However, distractor 
picture names should be less activated than in Experiments 1 and 2. This is because in 
those experiments participants retrieved and articulated both pictures’ names, while in 
the current experiment they were explicitly instructed to ignore the distractor picture. 
If the reduced demands of this task make it somewhat more impenetrable to 
interference, then the effect of Partner’s task might be reduced in Experiment 3 
compared to Experiment 1. 
In addition, participants in the DIFFERENT condition of Experiment 3 
produced a response that did not overlap in lexical content with their partner’s 
response. Therefore, this made it easier for participants to ignore their partner’s 
response in this condition. It is possible that this will further reduce the size of the 
interference effect (in the DIFFERENT condition only). Nevertheless, the literature 
on shared representations of manual responses shows that one’s partner’s responses 
are represented even when they are irrelevant to one’s own task (see Knoblich, et al., 
2011). Therefore, it is also possible that participants will form representations of their 
partner’s response even when it is irrelevant to their own task, as in the DIFFERENT 
condition of Experiment 3.  
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Finally, Experiment 3 provides an additional test of the task co-representation 
account. We have assumed that participants naming the same two pictures in opposite 
orders are performing different tasks, so that their beliefs about what their partner is 
doing might interfere with their own performance.  However, it is conceivable that 
participants do not represent the order in which their partner names the pictures (and 
therefore merely represent which pictures their partner names).  If this were the case, 
then the SAME and DIFFERENT conditions in Experiments 1 and 2 would in fact be 
equivalent in terms of what other-representations are formed. But this is not the case 
in Experiment 3, as the SAME and DIFFERENT conditions involve distinct target 
pictures. Therefore the task co-representation account predicts that naming latencies 
will be longer in the DIFFERENT than the SAME condition.  In contrast, the actor 
co-representation account predicts that naming latencies will be similar in the SAME 
and the DIFFERENT condition. 
Finally, note that we did not expect a main effect of semantic relatedness in 
this experiment, as most previous studies in which participants named one target 
picture found no effect of the semantic relatedness of a distractor picture (Damian & 
Bowers, 2003; Navarrete & Costa, 2005; but see La Heij et al., 2003 for a study 
reporting semantic facilitation). We retained the manipulation of semantic relatedness 
in the interest of comparability across experiments.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Thirteen further pairs of participants from the same community as participants 
in Experiment 1 and 2 were paid to participate. One pair was removed from the 
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analyses because one of the participants produced exceptionally long naming 
latencies.  
Materials, Design, Procedure, Recording, and Data Analysis 
These were the same as in Experiment 1, except that participants were 
instructed to interpret the color cue as indicating that they had to name the picture 
presented in that color (and ignore the other picture). 
 
Results 
Accuracy 
Recordings for 21 (0.2%) trials could not be analyzed due to experimental 
error or technical problems. For the remaining trials, we coded whether the response 
was correct or incorrect. Incorrect trials were trials on which the participant used the 
wrong name for the picture, used the correct name but produced it disfluently, or 
performed the wrong task (either did not name a picture when they had to, or named 
the wrong picture; there were 10 such cases in DIFFERENT, 11 in SAME, and 10 in 
NO). 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
No random slopes contributed to model fit (all p’s > .1). As can be seen from 
Table 5, the likelihood of producing an incorrect response was not affected much 
either by Partner or by Relatedness. The interaction of Relatedness and Partner 
contributed to fit only marginally (χ2 (2) =4.73, p=.09); no other factor or interaction 
approached significance. Therefore, the best-fitting model was the intercept-only 
model (hence this model is not reported in Appendix B). 
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Naming Latencies 
Naming latencies longer than 3000 or shorter than 300 ms were considered 
outliers and removed from all analyses. There were 6 such cases in Experiment 3. 
Values that were more than 3 standard deviations from the by-participant mean 
(1.6%) were replaced with the cut-off value.
6
 Mean latencies are reported in Table 6 
(see also Figure 3, Panel C). By-participant random slopes for Size (χ2 (5) =10.17, 
p=.07) and by-item slopes for Relatedness (χ2 (4) =22.10, p<.001) were included. 
Among fixed factors, only the interaction of Relatedness and Size significantly 
contributed to fit (χ2 (1) =4.74, p<.05). The factor Partner was not significant (χ2 (2) 
=4.33, p=.11). See Table 5B. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
In order to resolve the interaction, we used treatment coding to fix one of the 
two levels of the factor Size to zero and refitted the model shown in Table 5B twice to 
derive estimates for Relatedness separately for small (coding for Size: big = 1, small = 
0; i.e., “small” as baseline level), and big (coding for Size: big = 0, small = 1; i.e., 
“big” as baseline level) pictures. While there was a non-significant tendency towards 
semantic facilitation for big pictures (B= -8, SE = 7, t=-1.14), small pictures showed a 
tendency towards semantic interference, which approached significance (B= 14, SE = 
7, t=1.96). 
 
Discussion 
                                                 
6
 Additional analyses performed on the complete data set (with only the outliers above 
3000ms or below 300ms removed) yielded a similar pattern of results. 
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Unlike in Experiments 1 and 2, the effect of Partner was not significant in 
Experiment 3, although we found a numerical tendency in the same direction as in 
Experiments 1 and 2. Given that Experiment 3 had the same number of participants 
and items as Experiment 1, it is possible that the effect of Partner is less apparent 
under simple naming conditions. This could be because the simple-naming task is 
particularly undemanding (and thus less susceptible to interference). We explore this 
possibility further in Experiment 4.  Overall, we found little evidence that participants 
represented their partner’s response.  
Finally, we found an interaction between Relatedness and Size in the latency 
analyses. This interaction was driven by a tendency towards greater semantic 
interference when speakers where naming small pictures versus big pictures. 
Interestingly, we note that Damian and Bowers (2003), who reported no effect of 
semantic relatedness in a similar task, asked their participants to name big pictures but 
not small pictures. Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine the source of this 
interference effect. Given that our materials were not fully controlled for visual 
similarity, we cannot rule out that the relatedness effect was in fact caused by visual 
similarity (that could be greater between related than unrelated picture pairs).  
 
Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 was identical to Experiment 3, except that all stimuli were 
visually degraded. Degradation is known to cause quite large increases in picture 
naming latencies (e.g., Mädebach, Jescheniak, Oppermann, & Schriefers, 2011), most 
likely because participants take longer to retrieve the concept associated with the 
pictures. If interference from a representation of one’s partner’s task occurs only 
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when the task is particularly demanding, then we should observe an effect of Partner’s 
Task in this Experiment, unlike in Experiment 3. 
According to the task co-representation account, participants should take 
longer to initiate naming in the DIFFERENT than in the SAME condition.
7
 The actor 
co-representation account, instead, would predict slower latencies in the DIFFERENT 
and SAME conditions than in the NO condition, but no difference between the SAME 
and the DIFFERENT conditions.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Twelve further pairs of participants from the same community as participants 
in Experiment 1, 2, and 3 were paid to participate. 
                                                 
7
 Note that Mädebach et al. (2011) demonstrated that distractor pictures are 
processed more shallowly (as shown by a lack of facilitation from phonologically-
related distractor pictures) when the target picture, the distractor picture, or both (like 
in the present experiment) are visually degraded. They argued that processing 
constraints limit the amount of resources that can be devoted to encoding the name of 
distractor pictures in such cases. Because degradation makes it harder to retrieve the 
concepts associated with distractor pictures, it is therefore possible that participants 
would be unlikely to represent their partner’s utterances in this Experiment. However, 
this could only be the case for the DIFFERENT condition; if the task co-
representation account is correct, participants should still be facilitated in the SAME 
condition.  Whatever the effects of degradation, the task co-representation account 
predicts longer latencies in the DIFFERENT than in the SAME condition in 
Experiment 4. 
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Materials 
These were the same as in Experiments 1 to 3, except that a mask of parallel 
white lines (see Mädebach, et al., 2011) was superimposed on the pictures in order to 
conceal part of the lines. The proportion of masked lines varied from picture to 
picture; we tried to keep the proportion of masked lines constant for each picture 
across the related and unrelated condition, but this was not always possible because 
the mask superimposed on small pictures partly overlapped with the contours of the 
big picture. However, as explained above, we were not expecting participants to 
retrieve the distractor’s name in this experiment and, therefore our interest was not 
focused on the semantic relatedness manipulation.  
Design, Procedure, Recording and Data Analysis 
These were the same as in Experiment 3. 
 
Results 
Accuracy 
Recordings for 2 trials could not be analyzed because of experimental error. 
The remaining trials were coded as correct or incorrect as in Experiment 3. The 
participants performed the wrong task (either did not name a picture when they had 
to, or named the wrong picture) on 31 trials in the DIFFERENT condition, 24 in the 
SAME condition, and 33 in the NO condition. Counts (and percentages) of incorrect 
trials are given in Table 7, broken down by Partner, Relatedness, and Size of the 
named picture. By-participant random slopes for Size contributed to model fit (χ2 (5) 
=35.97, p<.001). The interaction of Partner and Size contributed to model fit 
significantly (χ2 (2) =10.57, p<.01). When naming big pictures, speakers made 58 
errors in DIFFERENT, 39 in SAME, and 34 in NO. When naming small pictures, 
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they made 48 errors in DIFFERENT, 58 in SMALL and 68 in NO. The best fitting 
model is reported in Table 6B. 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
To resolve the interaction, we fixed one level of the factor Size to 0 using 
treatment coding, and refit the model shown in Table 6B twice (once for big, once for 
small pictures). In addition, we tested for differences between DIFFERENT and NO 
and differences between SAME and NO separately (i.e., we used treatment coding for 
the factor Partner, and took NO as the reference level). We did this, instead of using 
planned contrast coding as in previous analyses, because the interaction was not 
predicted. When participants named big pictures, they made significantly more errors 
in the DIFFERENT than in the NO condition (log-odds B = .59, SE=.23, z=2.60), but 
they made similar amounts of errors in the SAME compared to the NO condition (log-
odds B=.15, SE=.25, z=.61). When speakers where naming small pictures, instead, 
they made marginally fewer errors in the DIFFERENT than in the NO condition (log-
odds B = -.37, SE=.21, z=-1.82); again, they made comparable amounts of errors in 
the SAME as in the NO condition (log-odds B = -.15, SE=.20, z=-.79). So, it appears 
that in both cases participants’ behavior differed when they believed that their partner 
was naming a different picture compared to when they believed their partner was not 
naming. 
Naming Latencies 
Naming latencies longer than 3000 or shorter than 300 ms were considered 
outliers and removed from all analyses. There were 4 such cases in Experiment 4. 
Values that were more than 3 standard deviations from the by-participant mean 
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(1.5%) were replaced with the cut-off value.
8
 As shown in Table 7B, by-participant 
random slopes for Size contributed to model fit (χ2 (5) =12.91, p<.05). Only the main 
effect of Partner was significant (χ2 (2) =11.20, p<.01). As shown in Table 8 (see also 
Figure 3, Panel D), latencies were longer when participants believed their partner was 
responding (naming: 817 ms) than when they did not (NO: 801 ms; Partner 1: B = 15 
ms, SE = 5, t = 3.35). However, latencies were no longer in the DIFFERENT (818 
ms) than in the SAME condition (817 ms; Partner 2: B = -.01, SE = 4, t = -.13).  
 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
Of course, this finding contrasts with the results of Experiment 3, where the 
main effect of Partner was not significant. However, in Experiment 3 we found a non-
significant trend in the same direction. To directly compare the two experiments, we 
ran a combined analysis of Experiment 3 and 4. We found a significant main effect of 
Partner (χ2 (2) =12.54, p<.005) and no interaction between Partner and Experiment 
(χ2 (2) =2.15, p=.34). There was (as expected) a main effect of Experiment (χ2 (1) 
=118.63, p<.001), with latencies being longer when pictures where degraded than 
when they were not (see Table 8B).
 9
 
                                                 
8
 Additional analyses performed on the complete data set (with only the outliers above 
3000ms or below 300ms removed) yielded a similar pattern of results. 
9
 The combined analysis of Experiments 3 and 4 also revealed a Relatedness*Size 
interaction (χ2 (1) =4.27, p<.05): a trend towards semantic facilitation when 
participants named big pictures (B=-5, SE=6, t=-.76), and a reliable semantic 
interference effect when participants named small pictures (B=13, SE=6, t=2.17; see 
Table 8B).  
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Discussion 
In Experiment 4, we replicated our finding that naming is slowed down by the 
belief that one’s partner is naming using a task in which participants name single 
visually degraded pictures. This contrasts with the failure to replicate the effect in 
Experiment 3, when participants were naming single intact pictures, though we note 
that the combined analysis did not reveal a difference between the experiments.  We 
therefore cannot be certain whether degradation enhances the interference effect from 
representing one’s partner’s task or not. 
In Experiment 4, the interaction between Partner and Size in the accuracy 
analyses was not predicted. The finding that participants produced more errors when 
naming big pictures in the DIFFERENT than the NO condition (but similar errors in 
the SAME and the NO conditions) might suggest that they represented the content of 
their partner’s response, as predicted by the task co-representation account.  But a 
similar pattern did not occur with the small pictures, and was not mirrored by the 
latency analyses, which conformed to the predictions of the actor co-representation 
account. 
 
General Discussion 
Our experiments had pairs of participants naming pictures and manipulated 
their beliefs about what their partners were doing.  We found that naming was slower 
when participants believed their partners were naming pictures than when they 
believed their partners were doing nothing or were categorizing pictures.  However, 
their naming was unaffected by whether they believed their partners were performing 
the same act of naming or a different act of naming.  Specifically, when they named 
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two pictures, it did not matter whether they believed their partner was naming those 
pictures in the same or the reversed order; and when they named a single picture, it 
did not matter whether their partner named the same or a different picture. 
Previous research suggests that participants represent each other’s task during 
non-linguistic joint actions (Knoblich et al., 2011).  In Experiments 1, 2, and 4, we 
found that participants named pictures more slowly when they believed their partners 
were also naming pictures than when they believed they were doing nothing 
(Experiments 1 and 4) or were verbally categorizing pictures (Experiment 2).  These 
findings demonstrate that participants represent their partner’s task during naming, 
and therefore indicate that co-representation takes place during language production. 
As well as ruling out the no co-representation account, our experiments are 
incompatible with the task co-representation account.  In other words, there was no 
evidence that participants were representing the content of their partner’s response. 
They were unaffected by whether they believed their partner named the same picture 
as themselves (Experiments 3 and 4) or a pair of pictures in the same order as 
themselves (Experiments 1 and 2). In Experiments 1 and 2, beliefs about the content 
of one’s partner response (same vs. different order) also failed to modulate the 
magnitude of the semantic relatedness effect (the lack of such modulation in 
Experiments 3 and 4 is harder to interpret given the lack of a main effect of semantic 
relatedness in those experiments). 
Our findings are also incompatible with the actor co-representation account as 
it is currently formulated (Wenke et al., 2011). Participants were affected by their 
beliefs about whether their partner was responding or not.  However, Experiment 2’s 
results show that interference is specifically due to the belief that one’s partner is 
preparing a naming response (as opposed to any response). We suggest that 
Running head: JOINT INTERFERENCE IN NAMING 
45 
 
interference is (at least partly) due to the belief that another speaker is concurrently 
engaged in the process of translating a concept into language (i.e., the process of 
lexical access; Levelt, et al., 1999), and that it is not entirely due to the belief that 
another speaker is producing a verbal response. 
Our experiments therefore showed that speakers represent whether another 
speaker is concurrently engaged in an act of naming and that doing so interferes with 
their own act of naming. Therefore, we propose that speakers use their own language 
production mechanisms to represent whether another speaker is about to produce an 
utterance.  Such a process is a form of internal (covert) simulation of another person’s 
behavior, and is consistent with the claim that beliefs about other people’s behavior 
can drive (or, indeed, are based on) such simulations (e.g., Goldman, 2006).  The 
interference occurs because production and simulated production share some 
resources.  
In one simulation-based account, Pickering and Garrod (2013) proposed that 
speakers predict their own utterances using “forward models” that are central to 
theories of motor control and its development (e.g., Wolpert, 1997).  Similarly, they 
predict what their partners are likely to say by covertly imitating their partner’s 
utterances and (in effect) determining what they would say next if they were “in their 
partner’s shoes.”  But this process can also cause the speaker to engage in some of the 
processes involved in actual production.  When two partners are speaking 
consecutively, this should not lead to interference, but interference may occur if they 
speak concurrently.  If speakers cannot hear their partners, but believe they are in the 
process of speaking, they may also predict their partners’ utterances and engage 
production processes.  This would lead to interference, even though they do not hear 
their partners’ utterances.  
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Pickering and Garrod’s (2013) account is concerned with the representation of 
other people’s utterances during comprehension. However, the mechanisms can be 
applied to situations in which the other person’s utterance is not heard, as in our 
experiments. In this case, the participant does not predict on the basis of a partial 
utterance, but rather on the basis of the belief that his or her partner is preparing to 
speak at the same time as him (belief which is in turn based on the instructions 
received by his or her partner). Thus an account developed for the purposes of 
prediction can be applied to cases of pure imagination (when the partner’s utterance is 
inaudible). 
So, why did participants experience interference and take longer to name 
pictures when they believed their partners were naming pictures themselves, 
regardless of whether they performed the same or a different act of naming? Neither 
the task co-representation nor the actor co-representation account can presently 
accommodate this particular pattern of results. Below, we explain this finding in light 
of Pickering and Garrod’s (2013) suggestion that speakers may covertly simulate 
others’ utterances.  
One possibility is that participants formed a representation of their partner’s 
response during covert imitation that specified only the partner’s intention to name, 
but not the content of the partner’s upcoming utterance. When the participants ran this 
representation through their own production systems, at the same time as they were 
preparing to name (according to their own instructions), interference was caused by a 
conflict between the speaker’s own intention to name and a representation of the 
partner’s intention to name. This could be interpreted as a form of actor conflict, but 
one that is specific to the task of naming pictures. 
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Another possibility is that participants ran this representation of their partner’s 
intention to name through their forward production model, thus anticipating the 
production of an utterance. This forward-model prediction could have triggered the 
allocation of resources away from the concurrent process of producing the 
participant’s own utterance, thus leading to slower naming latencies when the 
participants believed their partner was naming at the same time as them. Either 
version of this account would predict that speakers experience interference whenever 
they represent that another speaker is about to engage in language production 
processes (and specifically, in lexical retrieval) at the same time as them. 
The finding that speakers represent whether it is their partner’s turn to produce 
language, and that such representation interferes with the production of their own 
utterances, may help explain the observation that people tend to avoid speaking at the 
same time (Clark, 1996; Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974; Stivers et al., 2009; see 
also Schegloff, 2000). Turn-taking is a particularly important component of successful 
conversations, and knowing when it is one’s turn to speak is crucial to avoid 
overlapping with other speakers. This observation is compatible with our findings that 
speakers represent when another person is about to name, even in the absence of 
interaction. 
Future research should consider how interference depends on the nature of the 
stimuli and the nature of the interlocutors.  For example, our experiments involved 
joint picture naming, primarily because we assumed that interference would be most 
likely when the speaker’s believed that both participants were engaged in the same 
task.  But interference occurs in individual picture-word tasks (e.g., Schriefers, 
Meyer, & Levelt, 1990) and such interference might be affected by beliefs about 
one’s partner.  Indeed, some recent evidence suggests that picture-word interference 
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can be eliminated, but only if the speaker believes that her partner is naming a word 
that is presented in alternating case (Sellaro, et al., 2013).  Second, Tsai et al. (2008) 
showed that joint Simon effects are not present when participants believe their partner 
is not an intentional agent (i.e., a computer).  It may be that interference depends on 
the speaker believing that another intentional agent is concurrently naming. Third, it is 
possible that interference is dependent upon the belief that another speaker is 
producing language at the same time as the participant, and it might be reduced or 
eliminated if the participant believes that her partner is producing language before or 
after them. 
In conclusion, we have shown that naming responses are affected by the belief 
that another speaker is concurrently preparing to produce a naming response. This 
shows that language production mechanisms can be used to represent whether another 
speaker is about to engage in language production, even in non-interactive contexts.  
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Appendix A 
Experimental materials used in Experiments 1-4 
 
INSERT TABLE 1A ABOUT HERE 
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Appendix B 
Linear mixed-effects results for Experiments 1-4, and the combined analyses of 
Experiments 3 and 4. 
Experiment 1. 
Accuracy. The best-fitting model corresponding to analyses reported in text is 
shown in Table 1B. Additional maximal random structure LME analyses (with the 
correlation between random intercepts and random slopes fixed to zero) further 
confirmed these results. In the complete model (with all fixed effects parameters), the 
only coefficients significantly different from zero were the ones associated with the 
two planned contrasts for Partner (Partener1:  B = .33, SE = .14, z=2.36; Partner2: B 
= -.27, SE=.09, z=-3.13; all other p’s <.1)10.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1B ABOUT HERE 
 
 Naming Latencies. The best-fitting model corresponding to analyses reported 
in text is shown in Table 2B. LME analyses with maximal-random structure (with the 
correlation between random intercepts and random slopes fixed to zero, and the 3-way 
interaction of Size, Partner, and Relatedness by-participants removed to aid 
convergence) further confirmed these results. In the complete model (with all fixed 
effects parameters), the only coefficients significantly different from zero were the 
one associated with the first planned contrasts for Partner (Partener1:  B = 13 ms, SE 
= 5, t=2.77; Partner2: B = 1 ms, SE=5, t=0.16) and the one associated with the factor 
Relatedness (B: 16 ms, SE = 6, t= 2.73; all other |t|’s <1.9)11.  
                                                 
10
 Coefficients were taken to be significantly different from zero if |z|>2. 
11
 Coefficients were taken to be significantly different from zero if |t|>2. 
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Additional LME analyses were carried out on inverse transformed naming 
latencies. Such additional analyses used the maximal random structure that converged 
(see above). In the complete model (with all fixed effects parameters), the coefficient 
associated with the first planned contrasts for Partner (Partener1:  B = -19, SE = 6, t=-
3.33; Partner2: B = 3, SE=5, t=0.50) and the one associated with the factor 
Relatedness (B: -20, SE = 7, t= -2.83) were both significant.   
 
INSERT TABLE 2B ABOUT HERE 
 
Experiment 2. 
Accuracy. LME analyses with full-random structure could not be carried out 
due to convergence issues. However, a model with by-participant and by-items 
random slopes for both Relatedness and Partner (but not their interaction) confirmed 
that no factor contributed to model fit. In the complete model (with all fixed effects 
parameters), no coefficient was significantly different from zero (all |z|’s <1.6). 
Naming latencies. The best-fitting model corresponding to analyses reported 
in text is shown in Table 3B. LME analyses with full-random structure could not be 
carried out due to convergence issues. The most complex random structure that 
converged contained random slopes for the factors of interest (Partner, Relatedness, 
and their interaction), but not for the factor Size (nor for any interactions involving 
Size; we also fixed the correlation between random intercepts and random slopes to 
zero, as in previous analyses). In the complete model (with all fixed effects 
parameters), the only coefficients significantly different from zero were the one 
associated with the first planned contrasts for Partner (Partener1:  B = 12 ms, SE = 6, 
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t=2.16; Partner2: B = 3 ms, SE=6, t=0.50) and the one associated with the factor 
Relatedness (B: 19 ms, SE = 6, t=3.36; all other |t|’s <1.6).  
Additional LME analyses were carried out on inverse-transformed naming 
latencies. Such additional analyses used the maximal random structure that 
converged. In the complete model (with all fixed effects parameters), the coefficient 
associated with the first planned contrasts for Partner was not reliable (Partener1:  B = 
-12, SE = 7, t=-1.75; Partner2: B =-1, SE=7, t=-0.22), while the one associated with 
the factor Relatedness was significant (B: -23, SE = 7, t= -3.36).  
In order to better understand the reasons for this discrepancy between analyses 
with and without the inverse transformation, we conducted ex-Gaussian analyses. The 
inverse transformation is often used to normalize the distribution of the data. In our 
case, the residuals of LME models applied to inverse-transformed data are indeed 
closer to a normal distribution than the residuals of models applied to untransformed 
data. Ratcliff (1993) showed that the inverse transformation normally preserves power 
well. However, his simulations using the ex-Gaussian distribution showed that there is 
one case in which the inverse transformation is associated with a loss in the power to 
detect real effects (see Figure 5, p. 517). This is when the effect is in the  parameter 
rather than in the  parameter of the ex-Gaussian, and across-subjects variability is 
large (300 ms range in by-participant means in his simulations). 
We fitted an ex-Gaussian function to the raw data from each participant in 
each of the six cells in our design, obtained by fully crossing the factors of interest, 
Partner and Relatedness. Size was ignored to maximize the performance of the fitting 
algorithm, which is known to compute reliable estimates when the number of 
observations per subject per cell is at least 40 (Heathcote, Brown, & Mewhort, 2002). 
In our analyses the number of observations ranged from 39 to 50. We used the 
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maximum number of quantiles method provided in QMPE (Heathcote, Brown, & 
Cosineau, 2004), which has been shown to provide the best fits (Heathcote et al., 
2002; see also Staub, White, Drieghe, & Hollway, 2010 for an application to 
psycholinguistic research). We obtained estimates for the  and  parameters, and 
entered them into by-participant analyses of variance with Partner and Relatedness as 
within-participants factors. We also estimated across-participants variability by 
computing the range of by-participants means.  
For Experiment 2, we found no effect on the  parameter (all F’s < 1.4, all p’s 
>.200). Instead, we found a main effect of Relatedness on the  parameter (F(1;31) = 
7.275, p<.05). Crucially, we also found a main effect of Partner on the  parameter 
(F(2;62) = 3.306, p<.05). The interaction was not significant (p= .174). See Table 4B. 
The range in by-participant means was 581 ms in Experiment 2. This is not only large 
compared to Ratcliff’s (1993) simulations, but also larger than in Experiment 1 
(where the range is 368 ms). Therefore, we conclude that the inverse transformation 
should not be applied to data from Experiment 2. Furthermore, ex-Gaussian analyses 
confirmed that Partner has an effect on the distribution of naming latencies in this 
Experiment and, crucially, such analyses do not assume normality (to the contrary, 
they explicitly model non-normality).  
 
INSERT TABLE 3B ABOUT HERE 
 
INSERT TABLE 4B ABOUT HERE 
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Experiment 3. 
Accuracy. LME analyses with maximal random structure could not be carried 
out due to convergence issues. However, a model with by-participant and by-items 
random slopes for both Relatedness and Partner (but not their interaction) showed that 
no coefficient differed significantly from zero (all |z|’s <2).  
Naming Latencies. The best-fitting model corresponding to analyses reported 
in text is shown in Table 5B. LME analyses with full-random structure could not be 
carried out due to convergence issues. The most complex random structure that 
converged contained by-participant random slopes for Size, Partner, and Relatedness 
(but no interaction), and by-items random slopes for Partner and Relatedness (but not 
their interaction; we also fixed the correlation between random intercepts and random 
slopes to zero, as in previous analyses). In the complete model (with all fixed effects 
parameters), only the Relatedness-by-Size interaction reached significance (B = 22, 
SE = 10, t = 2.18). Simple main effect analyses confirmed that when participants were 
naming big pictures, naming latencies showed a non-significant tendency towards 
semantic facilitation (B = -8, SE = 7, t = -1.14); when participants were naming small 
pictures, instead, they showed a tendency towards semantic interference (B = 14, SE 
= 7, t = 1.94). 
 Additional LME analyses were carried out on inverse-transformed naming 
latencies. Such additional analyses used the largest random structure that converged 
(see above). As in the analyses with untransformed latencies, in the complete model 
(with all fixed effects parameters) only the coefficient for the Relatedness-by-Size 
interaction was significant (B = -46, SE = 21, t = -2.13). Simple main effects analyses 
confirmed the non-significant trends described in the previous paragraph (big 
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pictures, Relatedness: B = 20, SE = 15, t = 1.34; small pictures, Relatedness: B = -25, 
SE = 15, t = -1.68). 
 
INSERT TABLE 5B ABOUT HERE 
 
Experiment 4. 
Accuracy. The best-fitting model corresponding to analyses reported in text is 
shown in Table 6B. LME analyses with full-random structure could not be conducted 
due to convergence issues. The most complex random structure that converged 
contained by-participant random slopes for Partner, Relatedness, Size, the Partner-by-
Relatedness interaction, and the Partner-by-Size interaction, and by-items random 
slopes for Partner, Relatedness, and the Partner-by-Relatedness interactions (all 
random correlations were fixed to zero to aid convergence). The complete model 
(with all fixed effects parameters) showed that only the interaction of Partner and Size 
was significant (Partner1*Size, B = -.91, SE =.29, z = -3.13; Partner2*Size, B = .68, 
SE = .24, z = 2.91). Simple main effects analyses could not be conducted due to 
convergence issues. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6B ABOUT HERE 
 
Naming latencies. The best-fitting model corresponding to analyses reported 
in text is shown in Table 7B. LME analyses with full-random structure could not be 
carried out due to convergence issues. The most complex random structure that 
converged contained by-participant random slopes for Size, Partner, and Relatedness 
(but no interaction), and by-items random slopes for Partner and Relatedness (but not 
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their interaction; we also fixed the correlation between random intercepts and random 
slopes to zero). In the complete model (with all fixed effects parameters), only the 
coefficient associated with Partner1 was significant (Partner1, B = 16, SE = 5, t = 
3.03), thus confirming that participants took longer to name when they believed their 
partner was also naming pictures than when they believed their partner was silent. 
Instead, they took no longer to name pictures when they believed their partner was 
naming a different picture than when they believed their partner was naming the same 
picture (Partner2: B = -1, Se = 4, t = -.12). 
 Additional LME analyses were carried out on inverse-transformed naming 
latencies. Such additional analyses used the largest random structure that converged 
(see above). As in the analyses with untransformed latencies, in the complete model 
(with all fixed effects parameters) only the coefficient associated with Partner1 was 
significant (Partner1, B = -19, SE = 7, t = -2.82), but not the coefficient associated 
with Partner 2 (Partner 2, B = 2, Se = 6, t = .30). No other main effect or interaction 
was significant. 
 
INSERT TABLE 7B ABOUT HERE 
 
Combined analyses of Experiment 3 and Experiment 4. 
Naming latencies. The best-fitting model corresponding to analyses reported 
in text is shown in Table 8B. LME analyses with full-random structure could not be 
carried out due to convergence issues. The most complex random structure that 
converged contained by-participant random slopes for Size, Partner, and Relatedness 
(but no interaction), and by-items random slopes for Experiment, Partner and 
Relatedness (but not their interaction; we also fixed the correlation between random 
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intercepts and random slopes to zero, as in previous analyses). In the complete model 
(with all fixed effects parameters), the coefficient associated with Partner1 was 
significant (Partner1, B = 11, SE = 4, t = 2.68), whereas the coefficient associated 
with Partner 2 was not (Partner2, B = 1, SE = 3, t = .36). In addition, there was a main 
effect of Experiment (B = 112, SE = 5, t = 21.68) and also a Relatedness-by-Size 
interaction (B = 18, SE = 9, t = 2.08). Simple main effect analyses showed a non-
significant trend towards semantic facilitation for big pictures (B = -5, SE = 6, t = -
.76) and a significant interference effect for small pictures (B = 13, SE = 6, t = 2.16). 
 LME analyses on inverse-transformed naming latencies (with the same 
random structure as the analyses mentioned above) further confirmed these results: 
Partner 1 (B = -16, SE = 7, t = -2.39), Partner 2 (B = -1. SE = 5, t = -.16), Experiment 
(B = -199, SE = 8, t = -24), Relatedness-by-Size (B = -31, SE = 15, t = -2.00). Simple 
main effects analyses cannot be reported due to convergence issues. 
 
INSERT TABLE 8B ABOUT HERE 
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Table 1. 
Error counts (percentages) by Partner and Relatedness in Experiment 1.  
 DIFFERENT SAME NO 
Unrelated 95 (7.9%) 81 (6.8%) 76 (6.3%) 
Related 97 (8.1%) 64 (5.3%) 59 (4.9%) 
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Table 2. 
Mean voice onset times in ms (and standard deviations) by Partner and Relatedness 
in Experiment 1. 
 DIFFERENT SAME NO Tot 
Unrelated 869 (220) 869 (225) 855 (217) 864 
Related 881 (221) 886 (230) 872 (229) 880 
Tot 875 877 864  
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Table 3. 
Error counts (percentages) by Partner and Relatedness in Experiment 2.  
 DIFFERENT SAME CAT 
Unrelated  89 (5.6%) 100 (6.3%) 96 (6.0%) 
Related 115 (7.2%) 114 (7.1%) 93 (5.8%) 
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Table 4. 
Mean voice onset times in ms (and standard deviations) by Partner and Relatedness 
in Experiment 2. 
 DIFFERENT SAME CAT Tot 
Unrelated 881 (257) 879 (257) 874 (255) 878 
Related 898 (257) 907 (277) 885 (259) 897 
Tot 889 893 880  
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Table 5. 
Error counts (percentages, out of the total number of scorable trials) by Partner and 
Relatedness in Experiment 3.  
 DIFFERENT SAME NO 
Unrelated 45 (3.8%) 38 (3.2%) 31 (2.6%) 
Related 31 (2.6%) 46 (3.8%) 37 (3.1%) 
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Table 6. 
Mean voice onset times in ms (and standard deviations) by Partner, Relatedness, and 
Size in Experiment 3. 
 DIFFERENT SAME NO  
Unrelated 
Big 694 (174) 698 (171) 691 (168)  
Small 709 (148) 710 (176) 697 (152)  
Tot unrelated 701 704 694 700 
Related 
Big 688 (175) 692 (172) 681 (166)  
Small 716 (164) 722 (168) 719 (169)  
Tot related 702 707 700 703 
 DIFFERENT SAME NO  
Tot 702 705 697  
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Table 7. 
Error counts (percentages, out of the total number of scorable trials) by Partner, 
Relatedness, and Size in Experiment 4.  
 DIFFERENT SAME NO  
Unrelated 
Big 33 (5.5%) 21 (3.5%) 15 (2.5%)  
Small 24 (4.0%) 28 (4.7%) 32 (5.3%)  
Tot unrelated 57 49 47 153 
Related 
Big 25 (4.2%) 18 (3.0%) 19 (3.2%)  
Small 24 (4.0%) 30 (5.0%) 34 (5.7%)  
Tot related 49 48 53 150 
 DIFFERENT SAME NO  
Tot 106 97 100  
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Table 8. 
Mean voice onset times in ms (and standard deviations) by Partner and Relatedness 
in Experiment 4. 
 DIFFERENT SAME NO Tot 
Unrelated 817 (208) 813 (215) 798 (198) 809 
Related 818 (222) 820 (214) 805 (206) 815 
Tot 818 817 801  
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Table 1A. 
Big pictures, their semantic categories, and the small pictures they were paired with 
in the unrelated and related conditions. 
Big Small - unrelated Small-related Semantic category 
apple blouse banana food 
bed dress chair furniture 
boat leg plane means of transport 
bowl cake vase container 
bread guitar cake food 
cap vase dress clothing 
car seal helicopter means of transport 
cat pan fish animal 
drum table guitar music instrument 
foot pig ear body part 
frog banana seahorse animal 
glass waistcoat cup container 
goat cup pig animal 
hand seahorse eye body part 
horse trousers seal animal 
jug chair bottle container 
knife helicopter pan utensil 
nose plane leg body part 
onion ear carrot food 
pear bottle grapes food 
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saw eye pliers utensil 
shoe fish trousers clothing 
skirt grapes waistcoat clothing 
sock carrot blouse clothing 
sofa pliers table furniture 
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Table 1B. 
Best fitting model for the accuracy data in Experiment 1. 
Predictor Estimate SE Z 
Intercept -3.10 .18 -16.97 
Partner1: naming vs. NO   .24 .11    2.23 
Partner2: SAME vs. DIFFERENT   -.23 .08   -2.75 
Random effect Variance estimate 
Subjects: intercept    .48 
Items: intercept    .48 
Items: Relatedness     .56 
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Table 2B. 
Best fitting model for the voice onset time data in Experiment 1. 
Predictor Estimate SE t 
Intercept 874 24 36.72 
Partner1: naming vs. NO  14  5  2.79 
Partner2: SAME vs. DIFFERENT    1  4   .17 
Relatedness (related vs. unrelated)  16  5   3.36 
Random effect Variance estimate 
Subjects: intercept 11980 
Items: intercept 3150 
Note. Variance estimates have been rounded up to the nearest ten in all the analyses of 
naming latencies reported in this paper (the analyses were run on latencies measured in 
seconds, and then the estimates were converted to milliseconds for expository purposes).  
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 Table 3B. 
Best fitting model for the voice onset time data in Experiment 2. 
Predictor Estimate SE t 
Intercept 884 24 36.77 
Partner1: naming vs. CAT   12   5   2.47 
Partner2: SAME vs. DIFFERENT      3   4     .70 
Relatedness (related vs. unrelated)   19   5   3.48 
Random effect Variance estimate 
Subjects: intercept 16490 
Subjects: Size 13080 
Items: intercept 46670 
Items: Relatedness   4380 
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Table 4B. 
Mean values of the  parameter in ms by Partner and Relatedness in Experiment 2. 
 DIFFERENT SAME CAT Tot 
Unrelated 220 208 204 211 
Related 224 241 213 226 
Tot 222 225 209  
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Table 5B. 
Best fitting model for the voice onset time data in Experiment 3. 
Predictor Estimate SE t 
Intercept 702 18 39.87 
Partner1: naming vs. NO     7   4   1.88 
Partner2: SAME vs. DIFFERENT      3   3     .91 
Relatedness (related vs. unrelated)     3   5     .59 
Size (small vs. big)   21 16   1.34 
Relatedness: Size   22 10   2.19 
Random effect Variance estimate 
Subject: intercept 5990 
Subject: Size   320 
Item: intercept 2880 
Item: Relatedness   760 
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Table 6B. 
Best fitting model for the accuracy data in Experiment 4. 
Predictor Estimate SE Z 
Intercept -3.88 .21 -18.18 
Partner1: naming vs. NO    .05 .13      .39 
Partner2: SAME vs. DIFFERENT    -.08 .11     -.73 
Size: small vs. big    .10 .40      .24 
Partner1: Size   -.63 .27    -2.35 
Partner2: Size    .47 .21     2.18 
Random effect Variance estimate 
Subject: intercept    .39 
Subject: Size    .98 
Item: intercept 1.10 
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Table 7B. 
Best fitting model for the voice onset time data in Experiment 4. 
Predictor Estimate SE t 
Intercept 816 21 39.56 
Partner1: naming vs. NO   15  5   3.35 
Partner2: SAME vs. DIFFERENT      -.01  4   -.13 
Random effect Variance estimate 
Subject: intercept 8090 
Subject: Size  690 
Item: intercept 4220 
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Table 8B. 
Best fitting model to latency data in Experiments 3 and 4 (combined analysis). 
Predictor Estimate SE t 
Intercept 759 13 57.56 
Partner1: naming vs. NO   11   3   3.51 
Partner2: SAME vs. DIFFERENT      1   3     .47 
Relatedness: related vs. unrelated     4   4   1.00 
Size: small vs. big   22 16   1.39 
Experiment: 4 vs. 3 112   5 21.74 
Relatedness: Size   18   9   2.07 
Random effect Variance estimate 
Subject: intercept 2140 
Subject: Size 1100 
Item: intercept 2790 
Item: Relatedness   530 
Item: Experiment   890 
Note. By-participant random slopes for Size (χ2 (3) =13.91, p<.005); by-items random slopes 
for Relatedness (χ2 (3) =19.57, p<.001) and Experiment (χ2 (3) =45.42, p<.001). These slopes 
were selected using a forward method since very complex models would not converge due to 
the number of factors involved. The model did not include correlations among random slopes 
and intercepts, unlike previous analyses. For Experiment, the following coding scheme was 
used: Experiment 4: 1/2, Experiment 3: -1/2. 
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Figure 1. Partner’s task manipulation in Experiment 1 (sample trial from the 
unrelated condition; apple is displayed in blue, blouse is displayed in red).  
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Figure 2. Hypothesized effects of Partner’s task according to three different 
accounts: (A) task co-representation account; (B) actor co-representation account; (C) 
no co-representation account; apple is in blue, blouse is in red. The left-hand side of 
the figure presents static depictions of the relevant nodes in Mary’s mental lexicon, 
with nodes making up Mary’s self-representations at the top and nodes making up 
Mary’s representation of John’s response (that is, Mary(John)) at the bottom. The 
right-hand side of the figure presents a snapshot of the activation level of the nodes 
just before the onset of the word “apple” when Mary is preparing to utter “apple 
blouse” (unrelated condition) and John is either preparing to utter “blouse apple” 
(DIFFERENT), “apple blouse” (SAME), or nothing (NO). The degree of activation is 
indicated by the thickness of the circles. Pointed arrows indicate facilitation, while 
rounded arrows indicate competition. In the related case, banana would replace 
blouse and the strength of competition between banana and apple would be greater 
than in the depicted unrelated case. Bar graphs indicate the expected pattern of results 
under each of the accounts. 
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Figure 3. Mean naming onset latencies in ms for Experiments 1-4, by Partner and 
Relatedness. Bars represent standard errors of the mean.  
 
 
